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Introduction
Our paper questions the very idea of “risk communication” 
in order to argue for an alternative approach, the concept 
of “participatory risk assessment”. We will first analyse 
the notion of risk and its limits in the context of nuclear 
accidents1. The strategy of communication undertaken by 
the Japanese authorities will also be analysed as a “rhetori‑
cal marginalisation of science and democracy” (Hirakawa 
and Shirabe, 2015). Then, the paper develops the concept 
of participatory risk assessment. Participation has become, 
according the famous formula of Loïc Blondiaux and Yves 
Sintomer (2011), an “imperative” nowadays. The term “par‑
ticipation”, however, is widely used to describe a variety of 
activities. Topçu (2013) has shown, using the Foucauldian 
concept of “government of criticism”, how a series of in‑
struments (including some forms of participation) was used 
in France as a mean of taming anti‑nuclear critics. For this 
reason, we attempt to clearly define what “participatory” 
means in our paper from the outset. By “participatory”, 
we do not mean that communication is made simply in the 
presence of the population where information is transferred 
from the provider (one side) to the receiver (the other), nor 
“consulting” citizens in the last minutes for pre‑determined 
decisions that would concern their immediate future. More 
precisely, we call for a joint assessment where risk is framed 
as a threat (and not reduced to quantification and numbers) 
and the vulnerability of various individual circumstances is 
taken into consideration. This participatory approach also 
means that risks are debated openly and democratically 
with the participation of multiple stakeholders and actors, 
including counter‑ or independent experts and NPOs, and 
ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, many 
of the post‑disaster responses undertaken by the Japanese 
government sparked vivid debates and criticisms from the 
civil society. These concern emergency responses such as 
the revision of public exposure dose limit, designation of 
evacuation zones, distribution of iodine tablets, and risk 
communication as well as mid and long‑term policies includ‑
ing radiation dose monitoring, decontamination, waste 
management, return of evacuees, and health and food moni‑
toring. Convinced that such public agitation derived from 
their lack of scientific knowledge, the authorities undertook a 
strategy to enhance their communication on radiological risk 
and its health effects. In this paper, we attempt to challenge 
the traditional notion of “risk communication” which consid‑
ers that the concerned risks have been clearly defined by the 
scientific community and that the problem simply remains in 
communicating them “rightly” to the population. We argue, 
in contrary, that risks cannot be properly defined without 
understanding the “real” concern of the population – what 
they consider as risks ‑ nor taking into account existing 
scientific controversies and uncertainties. In such a context, 
what we need is not so much of risk communication but 
rather participatory risk assessment where risks are debated 
by multiple stakeholders and actors including counter‑ or 
independent experts and third parties such as NPOs, and 
are defined collectively rather than decided single-handedly 
by policymakers – the authorities and their affiliated experts. 
The paper is drawn from the preliminary results of the SHIN‑
RAI (‘trust’ in Japanese) project led by the French Institute 
for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), in 
collaboration with Sciences Po Paris and Tokyo Institute of 
Technology (Tokyo Tech). This research examines the rela‑
tion between science, expertise, trust and decisions in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident by conducting 
an extensive field interviews in the affected areas of the 
Fukushima prefecture. 
抄録 
福島第一原子力発電所の事故後、日本政府の対応について多
くの激しい議論が行われ、また市民社会から批判が巻き起こっ
た。公衆の被ばく線量上限の修正、避難地帯の指定、ヨウ素剤
の配布、リスクコミュニケーション、そして放射線量モニタリン
グ、除染、廃棄物管理、避難者の帰還、健康・食品モニタリング
といった中長期の政策的対応などがその主題である。このよう
な市民の「動揺」は科学的知識の欠如によると信じて、政府は、
放射線のリスクと健康影響に関する情報発信を強化する戦略
をとった。
本論文では、人々が懸念するリスクは科学によって明確に定義
することができ、単にそのリスクを国民に「正しく」伝えること
だけが課題であるとする昔ながらの「リスクコミュニケーショ
ン」の考え方に批判を試みる。このような考え方とは逆に、人
々が「実際」に懸念すること（市民が何をリスクとして捉えるの
か）を理解することなく、また、科学的論争と不確実性の存在を
考慮することなくしては適切にリスクを定義することはできない
と著者らは考える。このような文脈において、人々は「リスクコミ
ュニケーション」を専ら必要としているわけではなく、政策決定
者（規制当局およびそれに委託された専門家）の独断によるの
ではない、様々な利害関係者、および多様な専門家を含むアク
ターやNPOなどの第三者が集ってリスクを議論し、それが定め
られる参加型リスク評価が求められる。
本論文は、フランス放射線防護原子力安全研究所（IRSN）、
パリ政治学院、東京工業大学の共同研究である信頼（SHIN-
RAI）プロジェクトの中間成果に基づく。同プロジェクトでは、
福島県内の被災地の広範囲で現地インタビューを行い、福島原
発事故後の混乱における科学、専門知識、信頼、意思決定の関
係を検証することなどを進めている。
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are defined collectively, not framed as “individual deci‑
sions” or “individual acceptation of risk” where “incalcula‑
ble risks to personal health and reproduction are therefore 
privatised and experienced as random personal tragedies, 
rather than being recognized as systemic externalities” 
(Nadesan, 2013). 
The Notion of Risk: its limits 
The traditional notion of risk communication is based on 
an idea that the risk has already been well established by 
scientists and experts and that it simply has to be clearly 
explained to the population. The problem identified by this 
model of risk communication is a “bad” communication: for 
example, people may fear radiation “too much” because 
the information on risks has been poorly conveyed. Follow‑
ing this logic, the message has to be clear, pedagogical, 
and adapted to the knowledge level of information “receiv‑
ers”. In this case, information often becomes repetitive with 
almost no change in the content of the message. 
The limit of “risk paradigm” and quantification of risks
In the first place, we will discuss the paradigm of risk itself 
to approach the consequences of a nuclear accident. The 
concept of “risk analysis paradigm” is taken for granted in 
the field of risk communication. Our main argument is that 
this risk paradigm is far from adequate to account for and 
manage the aftermath of a nuclear accident. The notion of 
“risk” is indeed very much linked to being able to frame, 
visualise, and to quantify the consequences. The case of ra‑
diological risks after Fukushima demonstrated well indeed 
the difficulty of this quantification. As also summarised by 
Yannick Barthes during an interview: ‘when we speak of 
“risks” today in the environmental or health domain, we 
mean most often “threats”, uncertain dangers in fact. We 
are not so much confronted to risks than to situations that 
are uncertain, dangers that cannot be quantified. From this 
point of view, a notion such as “risk society” proposed by 
Ulrich Beck is slightly misleading because we did not enter 
into the risk society, in contrary, we have moved out of it2’. 
(Barthes, 2007)
The limit of risk assessment 
This is particularly true when risks are the source of contro‑
versies. In this case, epistemic and political divisions may 
result in different evaluations of risks. These different views 
may come from divisions among scientific groups or be‑
tween groups in opposition. In some cases, these divisions 
derive not only from different scientific opinions but also 
from a long‑standing divide between pro‑ and anti‑nuclear 
groups. The controversy regarding “low‑dose effect” is 
“as much scientific and technical as social and political as 
long as it raises the question of choice for nuclear energy” 
(Boudia, 2013b). 
Risk communication on radiological risk after Fukushima
Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japanese 
authorities seem to have adopted a risk communication 
strategy of a very “traditional” nature. They have chosen 
and nominated their experts to be in charge of assessing 
radiological risks and then of communicating such risks 
to the population. Most important post‑accidental poli‑
cies such as raising the public radiation exposure dose 
reference were decided thus following the advice of these 
chosen experts. Japanese uses a specific term ‘goyo-
gakusha’ to call experts who appear to be ‘patronized’ by 
the government or attached to the power structure, on the 
contrary to ‘independent’ experts who would speak freely 
on the basis of their knowledge and convictions (Onai and 
Hondou, 2011). Goyo‑gakushas are thus regarded as those 
taking into account the values and political agenda of the 
government. Many institutional experts and official advi‑
sors were considered as such after the Fukushima disaster 
regardless of their actual stances. In this context of lost 
trust3, independent experts or academics seemingly not 
under the influence of Japanese politics or nuclear indus‑
tries were quickly perceived, blindly in some cases, by the 
population as independent and their views unbiased. 
During these communications, the officially chosen experts 
often framed radiological risks as a problem of “communi‑
cation”. This approach is very close to what was described 
by B. Wynne (1991) as a “deficit model”: according to this 
model, the problem in communication lies with the knowl‑
edge deficit of the information receivers: the population. 
The role of experts, in this case, is to reduce this deficit 
by providing information and “enlighten” the public so to 
speak. There is no place for taking into account the knowl‑
edge already possessed by citizens themselves. They are 
seen either as unknowledgeable or, in some cases, naïve, 
possessed by false ideas and inadequate and exaggerated 
information, victims of pure rumours. For example, some 
of post‑Fukushima public communication uses an expres‑
sion such as “to fear radiations correctly”. This term leads 
us to suppose that the “correct” fear is the one established 
by the authorities and the others are necessarily “wrong”. 
Another pattern of public discourse on radiation risk 
involves the use of two distinct Japanese words: “anzen” 
and “anshin”, which mean “safety” and “feeling of safety” 
respectively. By this, the authorities imply that they are 
providing the information on “anzen”, a tangible scientific 
fact, while the civil society is reacting in an emotional and 
less rational manner, seeking “anshin”, the subjective no‑
tion of safety. The official communication often presented 
the risk analysis conducted by the government experts as a 
sole “objective” interpretation of risk which was based on 
correct and scientific views, while qualifying others as “sub‑
jective” notions of risk, based on an ideologically distorted 
or emotional views, which were held by citizen associations 
and the population, mothers in particular. 
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These characteristics of post‑Fukushima risk communica‑
tion have been analysed in detail by Hirakawa and Shirabe 
(2015) as a rhetorical marginalisation of what have been 
at stake in public anxiety and controversies over the risk 
of low‑dose radiation and radioactive contamination of 
foods, water, soil, and tsunami debris. The two patterns of 
marginalisation that they analysed are directly linked to the 
shortcomings of what we have called here the “classical 
approach of risk communication”. The first one “sciencepla‑
nation”4 is the reduction of wider dimensions of the issues, 
making social problems to a scientific dimension or as a 
matter of public misunderstanding of science. For exam‑
ple, the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) held an emergency 
lecture meeting after the accident with an objective as 
follows: ‘After the earthquake disaster, a lot of information 
about radiation has been released, and many people in this 
country are vaguely anxious about the effects of radiation 
on health. This emergency lecture meeting is intended to 
present correct information as it stands, to dispel anxiety 
about radiation, and to improve radiation literacy through 
lectures and panel discussions by leading researchers.” 
(Translated by Shirabe). The second form of marginaliza‑
tion is the mobilization of shaky or imbalanced scientific 
arguments in conducting risk communication for the public. 
This encompasses, for example, the claim that cumula‑
tive additional radiation doses below 100 mSv are safe, or 
employment of the theory of radiation hormesis. Indeed at 
the same lecture meeting, the SCJ invited four speakers, 
one of which gave a talk about radiation hormesis theory. 
At the end of the presentation, the speaker suggested that 
hormesis effects on human health were about to be sci‑
entifically proved. Who could imagine that the title of this 
lecture meeting was ‘to fear radiation “correctly”’?
The issue concerning the risk of low‑dose ionizing radia‑
tion is a long‑standing controversy, linked to the develop‑
ment of the nuclear industry together with the concept of 
radiological protection (Boudia, 2008). There has been no 
scientific consensus even today on the borderline between 
what is considered “safe” and “unsafe” of low‑dose effects. 
Scientific controversies may oscillate between “confine‑
ment” (to a circle of scientists and experts specialised on 
the question) and “de-confinement” (the detail account 
of the controversy emerges for public debates). Boudia 
(2013a) shows in her history of radioprotection how the 
controversy on low doses is “reconfined” to a circle of sci‑
entists in the 70s. “For some (institutions) it was important 
to try to contain the controversy within closed institutional 
arenas where negotiations were easier than in public”. The 
Fukushima disaster indeed transformed the debate on 
low-dose radiation effect from a confined to a de-confined 
controversy in a matter of several weeks in Japan. During 
the first months after the accident, the risk communica‑
tion made by the Japanese government was globally of a 
reassuring nature: there is little risk below 100mSv and the 
public exposure dose limit at 20mSv/year, which had been 
raised from the 1mSv/year one week following the accident, 
is an acceptable threshold for all populations including chil‑
dren, following the recommendation made by International 
Commission on Radiological Protection.
Participatory approaches: what definition? (Policy Rec-
ommendations)
The term “participatory” indeed encompasses a large 
spectrum of activities, so large as to include an initiative 
aiming to help people live with radiological contamina‑
tion. In such initiative, the risk assessment is often entirely 
and exclusively assigned to public and institutional experts 
and the paradigm of risk models is still considered relevant 
and valuable. This implies that “risks” are considered as 
tangible and calculable: the only question is how to protect 
oneself and his/her family, but a certain amount of risk is 
implicitly considered as acceptable. According to this vi‑
sion, there is no room for the public recognition of contro‑
versies, whereby controversies are deconfined from the 
simple disagreements within the scientific world and open 
to public debates. Moreover, experts are meant to “teach” 
people how to protect themselves from radiation and ulti‑
mately how to “live with” radiation, by developing proper 
behaviours and constant monitoring in order to make a 
link between their actions (taking a walk in the forest, the 
consumption of wild food…etc.) and the “results” in terms 
of contamination (revealed by Whole Body Counter and/or 
dosimeters). In her critics of the ETHOS project led in Be‑
larus, Topçu (2013) argues that, paradoxically, “the promo‑
tion of empowerment in the context of long‑term radioac‑
tive contamination may imply a new form of abandonment 
of individuals by the state and the international bodies”. 
Although she does not deny the need to assist these indi‑
viduals, she insists on the fact that living on contaminated 
territories should not be considered as “normal” and re‑
ferred to by means of a euphemism and concludes: “There 
are no real solutions –only partial rearrangements‑ for the 
management of contaminated territories”. 
The participatory approach for which we argue here en‑
compasses a much larger variety of actors and is thus quite 
distinct from the example shown above. Participatory does 
not mean only a “dialogue” between official experts and 
citizens, which can lead, in fact, to a situation where there 
is no other ways of defining risks than the ones already 
framed and elaborated by the authorities. In order for the 
genuine participatory approach to work, we propose the 
following policy recommendations with some concrete 
examples: 
1. Risk assessment exercise should involve counter‑ex‑
perts and scientists who may disagree with the official 
views on radiation risk as well as third parties such as 
NGOs and legal observers (or ombudsman). This al‑
lows risks to be framed more in terms of threats rather 
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than by percentages and probabilities, which neces‑
sarily calls for taking into account other elements such 
as justice and precautionary principles, in addition 
to science, in assessing risks (Boudia and Jas, 2014). 
These exercises would then help the affected persons 
to globally assess the situation and come up with their 
own decisions as to whether or not to return, resettle, 
stay and leave from their homes and start a new life.
2. In risk communication and assessment, scientific 
controversies should be recognised as a major issue of 
consideration and thus be debated publically. The un‑
certainty is not a side‑effect of science nor “one of the 
characteristics of the radiological risk”, but rather the 
central gravity which has many political implications. 
Taking into account such controversies may mean 
formulating policies based on precautionary principles 
accommodating worst case scenarios, and providing 
realistic options for the affected, for example, either to 
evacuate from or stay or return to the place of origin 
with radiological protection measures, treating both on 
equal terms with adequate financial assistance.
3. Participatory approach could also be a joint initiative in 
measuring radiological contamination levels. Currently, 
there are many citizen associations and NPOs meas‑
uring radiation on the soil, water, food and in the air. 
These activities should be promoted, financially sup‑
ported and even jointly implemented by the local or 
central authorities. For example, Naraha town has been 
measuring radiation levels around the Interim Storage 
Site (Kariokiba) together with resident volunteers. This 
could also help restore trust that was lost between the 
population and authorities following the accident. 
4. Finally, migratory decisions after the nuclear accident 
in the post‑emergency phase should be made in a truly 
participatory manner. Currently, many important deci‑
sions concerning the future of the affected population 
such as the timing of their return, are often predeter‑
mined by the government and are only communicated 
to nuclear evacuees at the last minute, leaving them 
often with no choice but to accept such decisions 
(Hasegawa, 2015). Moreover, the last‑minute consulta‑
tions are usually organized behind closed doors with‑
out any presence of media, NGOs, legal or independ‑
ent experts, producing often no record of what has 
been exactly discussed and thus leaving evacuees with 
little recourse. As such, evacuation orders have already 
been lifted in three towns, Tamura city, Kawauchi vil‑
lage and Naraha town, despite strong opposition from 
the evacuees. The decision‑making process for recon‑
struction thus needs to be more inclusive and transpar‑
ent, assisting a variety of options for the affected, and 
not emphasizing only the option of return and how to 
live with radiological contamination. 
The role of counter-expertise 
In the immediate aftermath of Fukushima, the lack of reli‑
able information related to the radiological contamination 
played a crucial role in the citizens’ loss of trust toward the 
authorities. Many felt that such information was released 
very slowly and with little explanation. Others believed 
that the government deliberately withheld critical informa‑
tion in order to minimize public alarm (Aldrich, 2013). This 
black‑out of information was also caused by the lack of 
measuring devices in the country. Under the circumstance, 
a number of citizen initiatives and associations sprang in an 
attempt to obtain such information and make it available to 
the public by procuring themselves such devices or calling 
out for help to the experts and associations abroad. These 
so‑called citizen scientists were motivated to develop their 
own knowledge and assessment of risks, instead of waiting 
to be “communicated” by the authorities, in order to set up 
their own base judgment on radiological risks. A number 
of them focused on measuring radiological contamination 
in the air, soil, human body and food items. These citizen 
initiatives include the Citizen Radiation Measuring Stations 
(CRMS), SAFECAST, Fukuro‑no‑kai, Radiation Watch and 
many others. Morita et al. (2013) qualified these civic radia‑
tion measurement initiatives as having become a collective 
response to the limitations of the governmental and institu‑
tional post accidental management, filling the information 
void created by the authorities and public institutions and 
performing an ad hoc role of public delegation. The same 
authors resumed, “public engagement with technoscience 
is called for most strongly at exactly those moments when 
established political and institutional frameworks fail to ad‑
dress collective concerns”(93).
Some of these organisations or individuals have positioned 
themselves as counter‑experts vis‑à‑vis governmental or 
institutional experts, and others didn’t. But these public 
engagements have made significant impacts on the post-
Fukushima Japanese society. One of them was that they 
offered an alternative view on risk, namely, informing the 
public on the existence of scientific controversies on low-
dose effect, apart from the traditional risk communication 
conveyed by the authorities. By doing so, they played an 
important role of paving the way for a new kind of partici‑
patory approaches in assessing risks, putting in question 
the existing paradigm of risk, shedding a light on essential 
life‑related issues which had been treated as periphery to 
purely scientific matters and calculations, and broadening 
the frame of decisions to be made after a nuclear accident. 
Conclusion 
Participatory risk assessment after a nuclear accident thus 
entails a truly democratic process of involving multiple 
stakeholders and actors including counter‑experts, citizen 
experts, legal experts, resident associations and NPOs, 
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which goes beyond the mere involvement of citizens in 
“managing” radiological risks or improvement of communi‑
cation on risks. It also encompasses, in our view, examining 
different views on risks by taking into account the existence 
of scientific controversies on the subject. This requires a 
process where counter‑expertise or other forms of alterna‑
tive expertise on radiological risks are to be recognised as 
legitimate partners in policy‑makings as well as risks are 
to be debated by experts of different opinions in front of 
stakeholders who then would be able to form their own risk 
analysis and make decisions with regard to their life choic‑
es: return, evacuate or stay in the place of origin. These 
different choices should be then treated and assisted on 
equal terms by the authorities in order to mitigate dispari‑
ties and tension within communities. Moreover, the partici‑
patory process should also allow the possibility to make 
alternative collective decisions at the level of a community 
or a village, to be relocated or resettled in another city for 
example, different from those pre‑chosen by the govern‑
ment. Nuclear accidents shake the foundation of so‑called 
democratic societies and call into questions the legitimacy 
of establishment and institutions. In this context, what we 
described as genuine participatory processes above could 
be a key to addressing some of protracted and complex 
issues that are facing the affected communities following 
nuclear accidents. 
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Notes
1 This is true that in emergency situations and for short‑term decisions, there is little room for taking into account various 
controversies, uncertainties, and participation of citizens (e.g., a decision to evacuate hospitals and nursing homes following 
the nuclear accident). Our focus here is on the risk communication where decisions do not have to be made in an urgent 
manner, as in the case of migratory decisions after nuclear accidents: whether or not to return home in the former evacua‑
tion zones.
2 Translated from French by the authors.
3 Concerning the post-Fukushima loss of trust, the Japanese government also acknowledges it in its official document. The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) produced a supporting document in November 2014, entitled “Regain‑
ing Trust toward the Nuclear Policy” (http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/011/
pdf/011_003.pdf), in which it says that “under the context where trust is lost toward the government and nuclear operator, 
risk analysis of experts would not be listened to (by the population)” (p.4).
4 Scienceplanation is a term coined by Shirabe, based on the concept of mansplanation which means the way (of a man) of 
commenting on or explaining something to a woman in a condescending, overconfident, and often inaccurate or oversimpli‑
fied manner. Similarly, scienceplanation is defined as the way (of a scientist or an authority) of commenting on or explaining 
to lay persons in a condescending overconfident, and often inaccurate or oversimplified manner. (http://dictionary/referec‑
ne.com/browse/mansplanation).
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